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HARVEY

[So F. No. 22241.

v.

DAVIS

In Bank.

[69 C.2d

Sept. 13, 1968.]

CLARENCE B. HARVEY et aI., Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v. HENRY D. DAVIS et at, Defendants and Appellants.

)

[1] Real Property Securities Dealers-Business of Selling.-Defendant husband and wife, by buying plaintiffs' $80,000 real
property for 24 promissory notes secured by second deeds of
trust, engaged in the business of selling real property securities within the meaning, and in violation, of the Real Property
Securities Dealers Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10237 et seq.),
despite plaintiffs' agreement to this form of payment and the
lack of evidence of any other similar transaction by defendants, where defendants, ignoring ibe license, bond, permit, financial statement and appraisal requirements of the aet,
answered plaintiffs' newspaper advertisement and in transacting the purchase dealt exclusively through agents and obtained
the $80,000 in notes from a mortgage company for only
$52,000, thus indicating defendants' willingness to conduct
business with members of the public chosen at random for :the
plimary purpose of retailing the notes for a profit, of

I

I

$28,000.
I
[2] ld.-Sale to the Public-Test.-In determining whether a sale
is to ·the public within the meaning of Bus. & Prof. Code, J
§§ 10237, 10238.3, regulating the sale of real property securities, the distinetion to be made is not between sales to one (or
a few) and sales to many persons, but betwecn sales to those
whom the Legislature deemed able to protect themselves and
sales to those deemed unable to do so.
[S] ld.-Civil Liability-Exemptions.-Defendant husband and
wife who, in violation of the licensing and other provisions of
the Real Property Securities Dealers Act (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 10237 et seq.), purehased plaintiffs' real property with promissory notes secured by second deeds of trust, were not
exempted from civil liability by the 1961 provisions of Bus. & "
Prof. Code, § 10237.1, making the reguilltions inapplicable, in
effect, to persons selling such notes through a real property
securities dealer, where, although defenda~ts bought the notes (
from such a dealer to effect the transactIOn, the dealer was
unlicensed and in any event acting exclusively as agent for

I

[lJ Who is "dealer" under state securities acts exempting sales \
by owners other than issuers not made in course of successive
transactions, and the like, note, 6 A.L.R.Sd 1425.
[3J See Cal.Jur.2d, Brokers, § 27.
.
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Real Property Securities Dealers; i
[5] Statutes, § 202.
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third parties, leaving defendants themselves as the principals
in the realty transaction, and where, although such transaction was negotiated by defendants with a licensed real estate
broker, the broker was not licensed as a real property securities dealer and was in any event acting as plaintiffs' agent to
sell their property, not as defendants' agent to sell their notes.
[4] ld.-Civil Liability-Exemptions.-The 1961 provisions of
Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10237.1, exempting from civil liability, for
violations of the Real Property Securities Dealers Act (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 10237 et seq.), any persons selling through a real
property securities dealer, reflected a legislative determination
that adequate protection will be afforded members of the puhlie if they deal with real property securities dealers who are
fully responsible for complying with the act, and thus' real
property securities dealers must be licensed as such to bring
the exemption into play.
[5] Statutes-Liberal and Strict Construction-Coverage and Exemption Provisions in Regulatory Statutes.-Exemption provisions in regulatory statutes are narrowly construed when
such a construction is necessary to accomplish the purposes of
the act, and coverage provisions are broadly construed to accomplish these purposes. Thus, just because: "real property
securities dealers" in the exemption provisions of the Real
Property Securities Dealers Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10237 et
seq.) must be construed as dealers properly licensed as such, it
does not mean that they must be so construed whenever those
words occur in the act.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County. Peter Anello, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages sustained in selling real property in
exchange for promissory notes secured by second deeds of
trust. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed.
Field, DeGoff & Rieman and Sidney F. DeGoff for Defendants and Appellants.
Weir, Hopkins, Jordan & Mitchell, Weir, Hopkins, Donovan
& Zavlaris, John F. Hopkins and Robert H. Weir for Plaintiffs
and Respondents.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Herbert E. Wenig,
Assistant Attorney General, and Burch Fitzpatrick, Deputy
Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on bellalf of Plaintiffs and
Respondents .
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-In February 1963 plaintiffs Clarence
and Stella Harvey, who owncd improved real property in Los
Gatos, listed the property for sale with Grant Rowe, a licensed real estate broker. Defendant Henry Davis answered
Rowe's advertisement of the property and expressed interest
in buying it for himself and his wife. After preliminary negotiations, the Davises submitted a written offer through Rowe
to exchange for the property notes of a face value of $80,000
s('eured by deeds of trust to be approved by the Harvt>ys.
Rowe told Davis that the Harveys were willing to make the
exchangc. Davis got in touch with the Rylee Mortgage and
Invt>stment Company and learned that it had a package of 32
1I0tes secured by second deeds of trust that Davis could purchase at a substantial discount. Twenty-four of the notes hlll1
a face value of $80,000. Davis instructed Rylee to show Rowe
nnd Harvey·the 24 notes and deeds of trust and the property
K('euring them. He told Rylee that if Harvey approved tlIP.
notes and deeds of trust, the Davises would buy the whole
package of 32 notes and arrange for :Rylee to sen the remaining eight to some other buyer or buyers. Harvey approved the
24 notes and deeds of trust, and the Davises bought tllem
through .Rylee for $52,000. They placed them in escrow
togetller with an assignment to tile Harveys and they were
delivered to the Harveys on closing the escrow.
Each note was for $3,350 at 7.2 percent interest and was
one of a series of notes each of wllich was secured by a second
deed of trust on a different lot in a subdivision in Santa Clara
County. Each had been executed on January 10, 1963, by
defendants Joseph E. Strawther and Bobbie Gene Strawther
on behalf of t.heir alter ego defendant Canary Construction
Company as obligor and in favor of their alter ego dcfendant.
Portola Enterprises as obligee. 'Vhen the Harveys took the
notes in exchange for their real property. the first deeds of
trust on the properties securing the notes were already in
default, and the holder of the first deeds of trust started
foreclosure proceedings a f('w days later. After t.lle fore(·Iosures the notes secured by the second del'ds of trust were
wortllless.
The Harv('ys brought this action against Mr. and Mrs.
Davis, the Rylee Mortgage Company.•Joseph and Bobbie
~trawther. Portola Enterpris{'s, the Canary Construction
Company, and othl'J·s. They allf'g"pd three causes of action: one·
based on 1'1'(11111, on!' basl'd 0)) vioIatio))s of the Real Property
Securities DenIers Act, find Olle for money had and received.

I
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After a nonjury trial, the court entered judgment against tlw
defendants named above for damages suffered by plaintiffs
from defendants' failure to comply with the provisions of the
Real Property Securities Dealers Act. Only the Davises
appeal.
The R~al Property Securities Dealers Act (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 10237 et seq.) was enacted in 1961 to protect the
investing public by regulating the marketing of highly speculative promotional subdivision second trust deeds and sales
contracts. (See Final RePQrt of the Subcom. on Real Estate
Contracts and Trust Deeds, 2 Journal of the Assembly (Reg.
Srss. 1961) Appendix, 23 Assembly Interim Com. Report No.
] 5; "Trust Deed Securities, The Ten Percent Business,"
Rcport of the Attorney General to the Legislature, March
1961; Mayer, Protection of the Investor in Real E.state and
Real Property Securities in California (1962) 9 U.C.L.A.
L.Rev. 643, 656-664.)1 It contains comprehensive provisions
designed to keep worthless promotional securities like those
involved in this case off the markct. A person dealing in real
property securities as defined in the act 2 must be a licensed
real estate broker who has secured an endorsement to his
license to act as a real property securities dealer (§ 10237.3),
lAppended to the act as passed was the following explanation:
, 'Emergency legislation controlling and regulating the market in mortgages and trust deeds was enacted at the 1960 (First Extraordinary)
Session of the Legislature. Since that legislation became effective serious
irregularities in the mortgage market have been discovered and the investments of many people have been placed in great jeopardy. TIIi~
deplorable situation was discussed in the 'Final Report of the Subcolllmittee on Real Estate Contracts and Trust Deeds,' of the Ass(>Jlluly
Interim Committee on Judiciary-Civil, dated December 1960. The Legislature finds that the bulk of promotional trust deeds as herein defined were
sold by so·called trust deed companies and brokers, purchasing and sellin~
such notes and real property sales contracts developed through subdivision
financing. As was pointed out in the report of the Attorney General
to the Legislature on 'Trust Deed Financing,' dated March Hlii1, such
notes and real property sales contracts were sold upon appraisals of
value far in excess of actual fair market value and subjected the purchasing public to all the financial risks in subdivision promotion and construction. Millions of dollars have been lost by investors through numer·
ous defaults on such notes and real property sales contracts. Permanent
legislation is urgently needed to provide uniform and effective regulation,
nnd to give stability to the mortgage and trust deed market."
2The 1961 version of the Real Property Securities Dealers Act was
effective on the date these transactions took place. Since then, the L('gislature has amended the act three times. All references, unless othenvis"
specified, are to the 1961 version of the act and to the Business nnd
Professions Code as of that date.
Section ]0237.1 defines a real propm·ty secul'ity to include:
" (b) One of a series of prolllotionn 1 not(>8 secured hy limls on separate
parcels of real property in one subdivision or in contiguous subdivisions.
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and he must file a bond and allnual reports with the Real
Estate Commissioner. (§§ 10237.8,10237.9.) No real property
security may be sold 3 to the puLlic unless a permit is obtained
from the Real Estate Commissioner. (§ 10238.3) Before becoming obligated, purchasers of such securities must be presented with a financial statement setting forth essential faets
bearing on the value of the seeurities and the dealer's estimate of that value (§ § 10237.4, 10237.5). Appraisals must be
made of the properties involved (§ 10237.6), and the commissioner may prevent deeeptive advertising (§ 10237.7). Every
person sustaining an injury from a violation of the act may
reeover damages from the real property securities dealer involved. 4 Criminal pcnalties are provided for wilful violations
(§ 10238.6).
In the present ease, the trial court found that the notes and
deeds of trust that the Davises sold to the Harveys were real
property securities within the meaning of section 10237.1, that
the IIarveys were not provided with the finaneial statement
required by sections 10237.4 and 10237.5, and that no permit
was obtained for the sale of the notes and deeds of trust. It
found that the Davises were principals in the transaction as
"(c) One of a series of real propel'ty sales contracts pertaining to
separate parcels of real property in one subdivision or in contiguous sub·
divisions, all of which arc executed by one person or persons associated
together as owners.

.
""As

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

used in this section 'promotional note' means a promissory note
secured by a trust deed executed on unimproved real property, or exe·
cuted after construction of an improvement of the property but before
the first sale of the property as so improved, or executed as a means of
financing the first purchase of the property as so improved, and which
is subordinate or which by its terms may become subordinate to any other
trust deed on the property, except when such note was executed in excess
of three (3) years prior to being offered for sale.
"Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this section do not apply to a person
who sells or exchanges a note or contract through a real property securities dealer."
SSection 10237.2 provirles: "As used in this article 'sale' or 'sell'
includes every issuance, creation for resale, disposition or attempt to
dispose of a real estate security fOT value and includes all of the following, whether done directly or by circular letter, advertisement, radio or
television broadcast or otherwise: an offer to sell, an attempt to sell, a
Eolicitation of a sale, a contract of sale or an exchange."
4Section 10239.4 provides: "Every person sustaining an injury resulting from a transaction suhject to this article which was in violation of
the provisions of the article may recover in a civil action against the real
property securities dealer the amount of the damages with interest at
7 percent per annum from the date of the injury, and shall be entitled
to be awarded a reasonable attorney's fee. Any such action shall be
brought within two (2) years from the date of the transaction or the
date the injury was discovered, whichever is the later."
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defined in section 10237 and concluded that they were liable
for damages and attorney's fees under section 10239.4.
Section 10237 defines a real property securities dealer as
"any person, acting as principal or agent, who engages in the
business of; (a) Selling real property securities to the public, . . . " and section 10239.4 provides for the recovery of
damages and attorney's fees from such a dealer. In view of
the fact that the trial court held the Davises liable under
section 10239.4; the only reasonable interpretation of its finding that they were principals as defined in section 10237 is
that they were real property securities dealers engaged in the
business of selling real property securities to the public.
[1] The Davises contend that there is no evidence to support the trial court's finding on the ground that aU that
apprars is an isolated transaction in which they did no more
than exchange for the Harveys' real property preeisely wllll t
the Harveys asked. They urge that such purchasers of real
property can in no sense be deemed to be engaging in the
business of selling real property securities to the public,
particularly when the transaction is not initiated by them.
Although there is no evidence that the Davises sold any rcal
property securities other than the 24 notes and deeds of trust
sold to the Harveys, the evidence fully supports the conclusion that they engaged in the business of selling real property
securities to the public. By answering the newspaper advertisement of the Harveys, persons whom they had never known
and with whom they dealt exclusively through agents, thc
Davises indicated a willingness to conduct business with mpmbers of the public chosen at random. (Securities &- Exchange
Com. v. Ralston Purina Co. (1953) 346 U. S. 119, 125, fn. 11
[97 L.Ed. 1494, 1498, 73 S.Ct. 981]; Mary Pickford Co. v.
Bayly Bros., Inc. (1939) 12 CaU~d 501, 514-515 [86 P.2d
102].) Although it was apparently not carried out, their plan
to buy and sell the remaining eight notes and deeds of trust is
also evidence of such willingness. By arranging to pay for
property worth approximately $80,000 with notes and deeds
of trust that they could secure for $52,000, they demonstrated
that the controlling business purpose of the transaction was
not the purchase of the Harveys' real property but the retailing of 24 notes and deeds of trust at a profit of $28,000. It is
immaterial that the Harveys initiated the transaction by putting their real property on the market and may have stipulated that the price be paid in notes secured by deeds of trust
instead of cash. The Real Property Securities Dealers Act,

\
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like similar rcgulatory statutes, presupposes willing buyers,
indeed they are thc vcry persons such legislation is designed
to protect. Had the Davises complied with the act and delivered the financial statement required by sections 10231.4 and
10237.5, it is inconceivable that the Harveys would havc
parted with property worth $80,000 in exchange for notes and
deeds of trust that could be purchased for $52,000 and that
,,,ere actually worthless.
'rhe conclusion tllat the Davises were engaged in the busincss of selling real property securities to the public within the
meaning of section 10237 when they sold the 24 notes and
deeds of trust to tIle Harveys, is supported by related proviRions of the Business and Professions Code. When the Legislature enacted the Real Property Securities Dealers Act, it
also enacted section 10131.1 of the Business and Professions
Code to broaden tIle definition of a real estate broker to inelude" a person who engages as a principal in the business of
buying from, seIling to, or exchanging with the public, real
property sales contracts or promissory notes secured directly
or collaterally by liens on real property, •.. " That section
df'fines "in the business" to mean the acquisition for resale
to tIle public or tIle sale or exchange with the public of thrf'(l
or more ·real property sales contracts or secured promissory
notes per year. Thus, in section 10131.1 the Legislature
defined engaging in business in terms of the number of contracts or notes sold instead of in terms of the number of
transactions involved. It would be unreasonable to assume
that the Legislature used the same words, "engages in the
business of," in the Real Property Securities Dealers Act, to
regulate only greater amounts of business activity than are
defined in section 10131.1 of the Business and Professions
Code. The Real Property Securities Dealers Act imposes additional and more stringent regulation on those dealing in the
more speculative types of real property securities where the
need for regulation is presumably the greatest. It is clear,
therefore, that a sale of 24 notes secured by deeds of trust
constitutes engaging in tIle business of selling within the:l.
meaning of section 10237.
~,
I.legislative history also makes it clear that such a sale made;;
to a person selected at random from the public is a sale to the 'I
public wit1lin the meaning of the act. The requirement of a II
sale to the public as a prerequisite to regulation was not in I
the bill as illtroducf'd in the 1961 session of the Legislature.!
(A.B. 1344, § 10238.1 (as amended May 22,1961).) When the j

I
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bill was later amended to include the requirement of a sale to
the public (A.B. 1344, §§ 10237, 10238.3 (as amended May 30,
1961», it was also amended to provide that "The sale to
corporations; pension, retirement or similar trust funds; or to
institutional lending agencies shall not be deemed a sale to th('
public for the purposes of this article" (A.B. 1344, § 10237
(as amended May 30, 1961)). In 1963 attorneys and real
estate broker licensees were added to the list of excluded purchasers (§10237.25, added Stats.1963, ch.1291, p. 2817, §4),
and in 1965 general building contractor licensees were als()
added. (§ 10237.25 as amended Stats. 1965, ch. 1796, p. 4138,
§ 2.) Thus, the Legislature has defined the public to excludt'
groups of buyers that would appear to be either experts in tllP
field of investments or to be well informed in the field or
real estate transactions. [2] Accordingly, in determining
whether a sale is to the public within the meaning of sections
10237 and 10238.3 the distinction is not between sales to one
or a few and sales to many 'persons but between sales to those
whom the Legislature deemed able to protect themselves and
sales to those deemed unable to do so.
[3] The remaining question is whether the Davises are
exempted from civil liability by the provision of section
10237.1 that "Subdivisions (b) and (c) [defining real
property securities] do not apply to a person who sells or
exchanges a note or contract through a real property securities dealer. "G
The Davises contend that they sold the notes and deeds of
trust through Rylee, a real property securities dealer, and
that the exemption applies whether or not Rylee was licensed
as such a dealer. There is no merit in these contentions.
The evidence supports the trial court's findings that the
Davises were principals in the Davis-Harvey transaction and
that Rylee was exclusively the agent of Portola, Canary, and
tIle Strawthers. The Davises did not sell the notes and deeds
of trust through Rylee. Instead, they bought them from Rylee,
acting as agent for Portola. and sold them to the Harveys.
Although the sale was negotiated by Davis with Rowe, Rowe
was not the Davises' agent to sell the notes and deeds of trust
but the Harveys' agent to sell their property. In any event,
~In 1963 this paragraph was deleted from section 10237.1 and its sub·
stance incorporated in the definition of a real property securities dealer
ill section 10237: "A p~l'BOIl who sells Or exehangtls a real property se·
curity as defined by subdivisions (b) or (e) of Section 10237.1 through
a real property securities dealer 81lall not be deemed to be It real propCl'ty
securities dealer because of such sale or exchange."

I.

I!
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Rowe was not a real property securities dealer. Accordingly,
the sale was not made through a real property securities
dealer within the meaning of the exemption.
To hold otherwise would create a serious gap ill thc regulatory scheme. Section 10237.4 requires the real property securities dealer to providc the buyer with the financial statement
describing the securities before the buyer becomes obligated to
complete the transaction. Since Rylee did not sell the notes
and deeds of trust to the Harveys, but merely allowed Harvey
to inspect them at Davis' request, Rylee was under no obligation to furnish a financial statement to the Harveys. It could
have complied with section 10237.4 by providing the required
financial statemcnt to the Davises. If, however, Rylee's sale to
the Davises to ellable them to sell to the Harvey's rendered
the latter sale a sale conducted through a real property
securities dealer within the meaning of section 10237.1, no one
would be obligated to furnish the Harveys with a financial
statement and the statutory purpose to protect them as potential purchasers would be defeated.
[4] Moreover, even if the sale had been made through
Rylee within the meaning of section 10237.1, it would be
incumbent on the Davises to prove that Rylee was a licensed
real property securities dealer to bring the exemption into
play. 'rhe exemption reflects a legislative determination that
adequate protection will be afforded members of the public if
they deal with real property securities dealers who are fully
responsible for complying with the act. Such protection would
be substantially vitiated if an owner of real property securities could sell them through an unlicensed dealer without incurring any responsibility on his own part to comply with the
act. The purpose of the act to proteet the investing public
precludes such an interpretation.
[5] There is obviously no merit in the contention that to
interprpt the words real property securities dealer in the
exemption to mean a licensed dealer requires the same interpretation whpnever those words oecur in the act. To so hold
would lead to the ridiculous result of excusing all persons J'
selling real property securities to the public from COmPlYing"
with thc act ulIless they clected to become licensed under sec- '.
tion 10237.3. The cOlltention overlooks the essential distinction
between exemption and coverage provisions in regulatory statutes. The former arc narrowly construed when such a construction is necessary to accomplish the purposes of the act,
I
and the latter are broadly construed to accomplish those pur-

I

)

poses. (See Loss and Cowctt, Blue Sky Law (1958) pp.81-83,
130; 1 Loss, Securities Regulation (1961) pp. 710-713; Securities & Exchange Com. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra, 346
U.S. 119; iSilver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski (1961) 55
Cal.2d 811; 814 [13 Cal.Rptr. 186, 361 P.2d 906, 87 A.L.R.2d
1135]; Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayly Bros., Inc., supra, 12
Cal.2d 501; 514.)
./ The jUdgment is affirmed.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied October 9,
1968.
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